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A RADIO DISCUSSION OF

AMERICA AND THE PEACEMONGERS

ROBERT KINTNER · WALTER LAVES · GEORGE SOULE

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ROUND TABLE

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NOTE

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AMERICA AND THE PEACEMONGERS*

A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST

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ROBERT KINTNER, Columnist, Co-author *American White Paper*

WALTER H. C. LAVES, Associate Professor of Political Science, the University of Chicago

GEORGE SOULE, an Editor, *The New Republic*

A radio discussion broadcast from the University of Chicago over the Red work of the National Broadcasting Company, Sunday, May 19, 1940, at P.M., Central Daylight Saving Time.

The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is dcast entirely without a script. Subjects are chosen because of their social, tical, or economic significance. The program has no "ax to grind." In the tion of speakers, the effort is to provide a balanced discussion by partici- ts who have special competence and knowledge. The opinion of each speaker is own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of ago or the National Broadcasting Company.

AMERICA AND THE PEACEMONGERS

MR. LAVES: Since this ROUND TABLE was announced, letter have been pouring in to the University asking for answers to specifi questions. Intermixed with these questions from ROUND TABLE lis teners have been some very touching expressions of opinion, espe cially from parents. They represent the kind of change that may b taking place in the American mind. The father of four sons write that he is now willing that his sons go to war against Hitler, bu only a year ago he was a militant pacifist who vowed that his son should see prison rather than war. A mother writes that she will no shed tears if her sons are called to fight forces which oppose freedon as we know freedom, but a year ago she, too, was a militant pacifist

Letters like these, gentlemen, seem to have outnumbered the ex pressions of pacifism ten to one in the mail we've received. Wha does this mean?

MR. KINTNER: It obviously means that the German *blitz krieg* through Holland and Belgium has brought home to this coun try that we live in a world of other nations and that war is drawin closer to us every day.[1]

MR. SOULE: I still think, however, that, though people do no

[1] *Latest Gallup poll figures (May 20, 1940) show two out of thre Americans feel Germany is winning the war and that the percentage o persons believing that the Allies will eventually be victorious has falle from 82 per cent at the outbreak of the war to 55 per cent now. In Febru ary, 1940, the Gallup survey gave 68 per cent believing America woul stay out of the war, while only 49 per cent now think we can avoid bein drawn in. For a* ROUND TABLE *discussion of the technique used by th Gallup and similar polls, see the November 5, 1939, broadcast—"Test ing Public Opinion."*

want to go to war, there is a greater degree of unanimity on the immediate aspects of American foreign policy than there has been for many months.

MR. LAVES: Don't you think that is partly due to the fact that up to this point American opinion about the war has assumed that the outcome of this war would be along one of three lines? Either you would have a British victory—in which case we would not be involved—or you would have a stalemate—in which case again we probably would not be involved, at least immediately—or you would have a gradual defeat of the Allies by the Germans—in which case we could still get in as we did in the first World War.

MR. KINTNER: You are right, Laves, but now there is a fourth alternative. In brief, it's a quick German victory—a victory within a matter of days. When Sumner Welles made his tour of Europe not so long ago Hitler is supposed to have told him that he would beat the British and the French by July. When Welles came back to this country, the experts laughed at the prediction. Today there is a feeling that at least there is a possibility that the Germans may win in a matter of days, or at least of weeks.[2]

MR. SOULE: Yes, it may be even a probability; but we should not forget that there is also a possibility that the Allies may win with equal quickness. I remember the second battle of the Marne in 1918.

MR. KINTNER: You mean the so-called "miracle battle"—when the French beat the Germans?[3]

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[2] *Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles visited Germany, Italy, France, and England early this year to examine the European situation and report to President Roosevelt. No comprehensive statement about the trip was ever made, though Mr. Roosevelt said ".... the information made available through Mr. Welles' mission undoubtedly will be of the greatest value when the time comes for the establishment of .... peace."*

[3] *The German attack of July 15, 1918, in the region of Rheims began the second battle of the Marne. The Germans were beaten back and a*

MR. SOULE: Yes, and just before that—in the spring of that year—a French army officer, whom I knew quite well, told me what the French strategic plan was. He said that General Foch would allow the Germans to drive through in their big push almost to Paris. While he would, of course, give strong opposition, he would let them come in the center of the salient, meanwhile holding the corners at the base of the salient firm, and when the German army was fully engaged he would start a counter-offensive, pinching off the salient and routing the Germans. I watched the procedure of the battle and that is exactly what happened.[4] This *may* happen again.

MR. LAVES: Of course, that may very well be true. It was the course of the battle during the first World War, but don't forget that the military situation has been very much changed by the introduction of airplanes. The Germans don't have to establish themselves nearly as securely in the northwest corner in Belgium as they did in 1914, 1915, and 1916. Now all they have to do is to get enough of a hold to start bombing London.

MR. KINTNER: With all due apologies, I don't think we are military experts. I think the thing we ought to discuss is American foreign policy.

MR. LAVES: I am interested in the fact that American opinion is caught right now between the fear of a great German victory and all of the consequences this would bring to the United States and a realization of our inability to do much of anything in the present campaign. Also, there is still a determined desire to stay out of the war.

French counter-offensive July 18 through August 4 eliminated the German salient and recaptured Soissons.

[4] *Ferdinand Foch (1851–1929) commanded a corps at the beginning of the World War, later headed the ninth army, and on April 14, 1918, was named commander-in-chief of all Allied armies in France.*

MR. SOULE: Yes, I think that's true. One thing people don't quite realize is that if Hitler wins quickly we can't do anything to help the Allies.

MR. KINTNER: I think you're right. It is obvious that if he wins in a matter of days or weeks we can do nothing. But perhaps he won't, and certainly then the country should devote itself to a long-run look at what American foreign policy should be.

MR. LAVES: I suspect there is no one of the three of us who knows more about American foreign policy than you, as one of the authors of that very excellent little pamphlet, *American White Paper.*[5] You've gone over American policy during the last four or five years. What is the American foreign policy?

MR. KINTNER: You're very kind. I'm sure we can't tell you what American foreign policy is as well as the State Department or the President could. However, we have summarized it in the *American White Paper* and I think it would benefit all of us, for the basis of discussion, to take the five main principles of the President's program and see what we think of them.

MR. LAVES: What was the implication of your remark that you could not say it as well as the State Department could? Is this *White Paper* an official statement from the American government?

MR. KINTNER: No, it's not an official statement; it's a job of reporting done by Joe Alsop and myself which, incidentally, Soule calls the "American Whitewash." We disagree. We think we have accurately reported what this Administration has done.

MR. SOULE: We could discuss that at great length—but that would take us into previous history, so let's go ahead with the present situation.

MR. KINTNER: It seems to me that the first three principles are rather academic now. The first is, I believe, the principle of the

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[5] *See the list of suggested readings on page 26.*

President that only by disarmament and an opening of trade can the world return to common sense.

MR. LAVES: What do you mean, this is academic?

MR. KINTNER: There is a war being fought in Europe *now*, and disarmament and opening of trade seem farther away than they ever seemed before. That's why I say it's academic.

MR. LAVES: I still don't think that means it's academic. What we are interested in is American policy in regard to this war and it seems to me that is going to be influenced by our idea of the best way in which we can get disarmament and the opening of trade after the war.

MR. SOULE: Yes, but if Hitler wins the war in the next three weeks it's being academic, and I think that is what Kintner meant.

MR. KINTNER: Soule, you're right, and Laves, it seems to me, you are also right. We should never forget, however, that disarmament and opening of trade must remain an American principle —whether Hitler wins or not—as a long-term objective. But, as you say, Soule, it's a pretty long term.

MR. SOULE: We will agree as to that in the future.

MR. KINTNER: It seems to me that the President's second principle can be stated as follows: Neutrals are parties of interest in a modern war, and particularly in the postwar settlement.

MR. LAVES: Just a second! What does that mean?

MR. KINTNER: A neutral country, whether it gets into the war or not, should take a part in the postwar peace settlement. In the meantime, everything that goes on in Europe, it seems to me, is our business. I don't believe one out of a hundred people any longer thinks that the war in Europe is none of America's business.

MR. SOULE: I don't think it is our business to redraw the boundaries of European nations, but the economic settlement of the world after the war *is* our business and we can probably exercise an even greater influence on that if we remain neutral.

THE COSTS OF WAR

NATIONAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

VETERANS' PENSIONS AND BENEFITS



EACH COMPLETE SYMBOL EQUALS 500 MILLION DOLLARS

From the Financial Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1939

MR. LAVES: Aren't you making a rather fantastic distinction here between economic and political factors? How can you talk about drawing political boundaries unless you take into account the kind of an economic world you are going to live in?

MR. SOULE: You can't, but at the same time there are divisions of spheres of interest as we have in our own federal government and it's Europe's business what kind of government it has. We can't impose democracy on them, or say that the boundary of Bulgaria shall be here or there. We should make a mistake if we did. I think the President is dead wrong on that.

MR. KINTNER: I think the President has cut across these lines rather well and made sort of a compromise. He has, I think, set forward the principle that we would make economic commitments in order to produce a stable world economy, but we would make no political commitments. It isn't internationalism and it isn't isolationism. It just takes account, realistically, of the fact that we live in a world of other nations.

MR. SOULE: That's quite true, and I think we must have a part in rebuilding the world economically when the war is over.

MR. LAVES: Soule, there you go again! You want to have a part in rebuilding this world after the war is over. It seems to me that the position of the isolationists in this country—and those, incidentally, who have called this recent *White Paper* "American Whitewash"— is a position that has nothing to do with the realities. They say: "We don't want to get mixed up with the politics of Europe, but somehow we do want to get all the benefits of a profitable European economic system.

MR. SOULE: We want to protect ourselves against the collapse of the European economic system, but I heartily disagree with you that they were wrong in their estimate of events previously.

MR. KINTNER: Could I interrupt you a minute to recall the famous conference in the White House last summer? The scene was the Oval Room of the White House. The President was there with

the Congressional leaders. The President and Secretary of State Hull, on the basis of the cables, were painting a very dark picture of the possibility of war.

Senator Borah, the great leader of the isolationist fight, was there and he could not contain himself. He finally interrupted Hull and the President to say: "No one can foretell what might happen, but my feeling and belief is that we are not going to have a war. Germany isn't ready for it."

In turn Hull said: "I wish the Senator would come down to my office and read the cables. I am sure he would come to the conclusion that there is far more danger of war than he thinks."

Borah answered: "So far as the reports of your Department are concerned, I would not be bound by them. I have my own sources of information which I provided for myself and on several occasions I found them more reliable than the State Department."

It seems to me that anecdote is very important because constantly the President and the State Department have information which the public does not have.[6]

MR. SOULE: But it isn't a question of information. I disagreed with Borah about that as I disagreed with him about many other things. I think the American people expected another European war and that was the reason they adopted a firm neutrality policy: to guard against the danger of becoming involved.

MR. KINTNER: That would be right on the basis that, if Congress represents what the public thinks, it refused to repeal the arms embargo for months and months, and it took actual outbreak of war to bring the repeal.

MR. LAVES: It seems to me, Soule, that the people who took the isolationist position—whether they were Borah or some of his followers since that time (one does not need to mention names)—

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[6] *The meeting referred to here was held July 18. Senator Borah, who died January 19, 1940, was one of the most militant isolationists in the Senate.*

those people have simply refused to face the facts. If they did know that there was a war coming and that it was inevitable, then it seems to me that their policy has been nothing short of criminal during the last twenty years.

MR. SOULE: They knew it was coming and they wanted to stay out of it. That doesn't mean they were isolationists. "Isolationist" is a very vague term, but they still want to stay out of it, and so do you.

MR. KINTNER: Well, gentlemen, if I may interrupt..... It seems to me this is very academic. I see no reason for fighting over the problem of American foreign policy from the days of the first World War to now. It seems to me the question is, how about the present American foreign policy? What do we think of that?

MR. LAVES: Well, the present foreign policy of the United States has to show the influence of this backwardness on the part of American opinion in regard to international policy.

MR. KINTNER: I agree with you completely.

MR. LAVES: You see it particularly in the extraordinary shift that has taken place in American opinion in the course of the last ten days. What the President has been talking about during the last few days—especially in his defense message—is essentially what he has been talking about ever since the Chicago bridge speech when he said that you have to quarantine, you have to lock up the aggressors, and keep goods from going to them.[7]

MR. SOULE: This is quite a different matter.

MR. LAVES: It isn't!

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[7] *On October 5, 1937, President Roosevelt spoke at the dedication of a bridge in Chicago, pointing out that war anywhere affected people everywhere, that quarantines were used to prevent the spread of contagious disease, and that war, like disease, was contagious. From these facts President Roosevelt concluded: "America hates war. America hopes for peace. Therefore, America actively engages in the search for peace."*

MR. SOULE: He is now talking about preparing to defend this ...try. He isn't talking about imposing military quarantines.

MR. KINTNER: May I interrupt both of you gentlemen to see if ... an find out what the President's policy is? First of all, the prob... is, are we going to war? The President, it seems to me, is on the ...rd. He has said publicly that he *hopes* we can stay out of war. ... hasn't said, like Wilson, said that we *will* keep out of war. He ... said privately that whatever happens we won't send troops ...oad. To me, that doesn't sound like warmongering, which ...ryone accuses Roosevelt of.

MR. LAVES: On the other hand, I would still like to come back ... to my friend Soule. It seems to me that again the people who ... stood in the way of the President's policy since the "quaran...e" speech in Chicago have been standing in the way of realities.

MR. SOULE: But just the same. . . . .

MR. LAVES: Wait a minute! Let me finish this.

MR. KINTNER: I'll part you boys when you get too close.

MR. LAVES: The question of what you are going to do in the ...e of international crisis is determined by what you have been ...ng before the crisis arises, and since 1935 the United States has ...n deliberately encouraging aggression on the part of Hitler by ...ing it is none of our concern what goes on in the world.

MR. SOULE: When Roosevelt made his quarantine speech, ...amberlain was in power in England and Daladier was in power ... France. Neither of them meant collective security seriously. ...ey were both engaged in a policy of appeasement.[8]

MR. KINTNER: So you would not criticize the President. He ...ay have had the right policy. It just happens that the French ...d British weren't ready to cooperate.

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[8] *By the Munich accord of September, 1938, Czechoslovakia ceded ... "Sudeten German" areas to Germany. This accord, Prime Min...ter Chamberlain said at the time, "assures us of peace in our time."*

MR. SOULE: He was speaking of a way in which the American people would not back him up at the time, and so he was just uttering empty threats which had no effect on what Hitler did.

MR. KINTNER: Public opinion is just catching up.

MR. LAVES: On the other hand, though, it is also true that it is the function of the President to conduct our foreign relations, and what I am taking issue with is the position of people who—until the Germans marched into Holland and Belgium and France—were resisting any efforts to check that march, and now suddenly jump on the band wagon and say, "Me, too! Let's add another billion!"

MR. SOULE: Don't forget this: that the neutrality act, which was supported by these people, has two aspects.[9] In the first place, to keep us out of trouble by preventing our ships from being sunk, our citizens from being killed, and our goods from being captured by the blockade. The other aspect is that it resigns any protest against the British blockade because we are not trying to send ships and goods to Germany and to Britain's enemies. Furthermore, it opens up our markets to the Allies. It practically gives them a monopoly on those markets by saying that the belligerents must come and get the goods and take them home and pay for them in cash.

MR. LAVES: Yes, but you also realize that that is simply due to the geographical location of the British and not to the wisdom of the people who backed that act.

MR. SOULE: It was seen very clearly by many experts who studied the neutrality act before it was put on the statute books.

MR. KINTNER: Gentlemen, I seem to be throwing cold water constantly, but let's get away from the discussion of whether the

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[9] *The neutrality act of 1935 was first amended in 1937. The so-called "cash-and-carry" clause expired May 1, 1939. On November 3, 1939, both Houses of Congress passed amendments eliminating the embargo on the sale of arms but re-enacting the "cash-and-carry" sections of the law.*

trality act is good or bad and let's see actually what the Administration is doing now and what it can do in the future.

MR. LAVES: Except that I would still like to get it into the record that the cost we are facing at the present time of billions of dollars—it's going to be billions, not merely one billion[10]—is the cost we are paying for our shortsighted ostrich policy of the past fifteen years.

MR. KINTNER: I agree with you, and it is in the record.

MR. SOULE: I'll amend the record to say it was principally due to the policy of the British and French governments.

MR. LAVES: There you go again!

MR. KINTNER: The second active principle of the Administration at the present time is what is known as "methods short of war." Everyone knows that the President is in favor of the democracies. Everyone knows that he is trying to help them. He is trying to help them by what he calls "methods short of war."

MR. LAVES: What are "methods short of war?"

MR. KINTNER: There are various methods. The outstanding one, of course, is repeal of the arms embargo which gave to the French and British arms made in this country. There have been other methods short of war: the public statements of the President aligning ourselves with the democracies; the notes in the Far East warning the Japanese against seizing the Dutch East Indies. The defense program is a method short of war in that, in effect, it serves notice on Mussolini that we may come in at some time, or at least we may be prepared to come in.

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[10] *The sum President Roosevelt requested in his message to Congress May 16, 1940, was $1,182,000,000, of which $796,000,000 was for Army, Navy, and Marine Corps appropriations, $186,000,000 for contract authorizations for the same services, and $200,000,000 (half as an immediate appropriation, and half as an authorization) for special executive expenditures.*

THE EFFECT OF WAR

1939*



EACH COMPLETE SYMBOL EQUALS ONE BILLION DOLLARS

MR. LAVES: And wouldn't you say also that if we were now to repeal the neutrality law that that would be an act short of war which might have very important diplomatic effects?

MR. KINTNER: Yes, I think it would. There is a great difference of opinion in the country as to whether we should or not because of the "cash-and-carry" provisions.

MR. SOULE: But as a matter of fact the "cash-and-carry" provisions are a protection to the British and French.

MR. LAVES: In what way?

MR. SOULE: What is there in the neutrality act now that would hinder the British and French?

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*"*World Almanac*" estimates.

TARY EXPENDITURES

1940 (ESTIMATED) †



EACH COMPLETE SYMBOL EQUALS ONE BILLION DOLLARS

MR. LAVES: Of course, the most important thing about the eutrality law—and you recall, of course, the fight that had to be ade to get some of these people who contributed to this war to nally concede to the amendment and repeal of the arms embargo— that it still stands as a statement of American policy: That we on't care particularly what is going on in the world. It's none of ur concern.

MR. SOULE: No, not at all! It stands as a statement of the merican policy: that we don't intend to be brought into the war y economic interests or by something that will trick or influence ur decision.

† *"New York Times" estimate for Britain, Germany, and France; U.S.S.R., from Molotov budget message, ruble at $.05; U.S.A., 1940 udget plus emergency request by President Roosevelt.*

MR. KINTNER: Could I interrupt you? It seems to me that in discussing methods short of war we should go along the lines that you two gentlemen are taking toward the major purpose. You should make it concrete. For example, this proposal now not to repeal the Johnson act[11] and give them credits, but rather, after they exhaust their assets, to actually give them goods. It seems to me that that would avoid the implications you talk about: that we might be brought into the war through loans because giving goods would make no connecting link.

MR. SOULE: In the first place, I think that is an issue which is still academic. It was reckoned before the war that the cash purchasing power of the Allies in this country was in the neighborhood of eight billion dollars.[12]

MR. LAVES: I take it what you are both trying to avoid, then, is the possibility of unpaid debts at the end of this war.

MR. SOULE: Quite so, and I think the British and French have spent very little here so far.

MR. KINTNER: But still we must not forget that the war has changed. There is now a *blitzkrieg* on and the money may be spent. It may be a matter of months before they exhaust their assets.

MR. LAVES: Wouldn't it be better to send what we have for our army and navy at the present time?

MR. KINTNER: Certainly, for example, to give airplanes to England and France while we build up our production is one of the soundest principles of the War and Navy and Treasury Departments, I believe.

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[11] *The Johnson act is the law forbidding loans to governments in default on interest payments for debts already contracted.*

[12] *At the outbreak of the war last year the total Allied purchasing power usable in this country was estimated by the Federal Reserve Board's "Bulletin" to be $8,440,000,000.*

MR. SOULE: And in any case let's avoid war credits because they are simply a pretense. We all know that war debts were not repaid last time, could not be repaid, and will not be repaid this time.

MR. LAVES: We didn't want them repaid.

MR. SOULE: We didn't allow them to be repaid. Instead of doing that, if it ever comes to that point, let's adopt some other device, like giving them a subsidy.

MR. LAVES: As you are putting this thing Kintner—and I judge this is again largely on the basis of your recent investigations described in the *American White Paper*—you feel that there is a consistent policy on the part of the President and the State Department which is aimed at the protection of America's best interests·

MR. KINTNER: I certainly think there has been. Since the Munich of 1938 it seems to me the State Department and the President have developed not only a sound and rational, but a realistic, policy.

MR. LAVES: I would entirely subscribe to that, but I would like to add to it that it is also my impression that those who, in general, have criticized our foreign policy since the time of the Munich crisis, have not been formulating an alternative policy but simply have been playing obstructionist politics.

MR. KINTNER: I think that is true—a great deal of it has been political. You remember the conference a year ago when the President was supposed to have said that our frontier is on the Rhine. He did not say that our frontier is on the Rhine. What he did say was that if the frontier of the Rhine broke it would have a great effect on us. That is quibbling over things that are not different, but just the perversion of it created an isolationist sentiment. Now today he has been amply proved to be correct.

MR. SOULE: I hate to keep going back to old issues—I agree with you, Kintner, that that is not a good thing to do at the mo-

WARS: ENDED BUT NOT PAID FOR

PENSIONERS ON ROLLS, INCLUDING NURSES AND WIDOWS

War of 1812 [1]

War with Mexico [168]

Indian Wars [6,776]

Civil War

War with Spain

World War

EACH COMPLETE SYMBOL EQUALS 50 THOUSAND

nt—but I think very briefly it can be said that there are two or criticisms of the President's past foreign policy. One is that ague statements—such as were made in the Chicago quarantine ech—he frightened the isolationists into putting up a more bitter osition than otherwise they might have done because they sus- ted he was trying to lead us into war.

MR. KINTNER: The truth is, if I may interrupt all of you, the lationists never believed the cables. No matter what the State partment tells them is going to happen, they know better.

MR. SOULE: The second criticism is that he was constantly ing threats which Hitler knew he was not in position to back up. 's not do that any more.

MR. KINTNER: I agree that we should not make threats that cannot back up.

MR. LAVES: Just a second! Isn't the real issue, then, whether isolationists who stood in the way of a constructive foreign pol- since the Munich crisis have been unwilling simply to face the s? They didn't like war, so they buried their heads.

MR. SOULE: I don't want to go into past history and I object the term "isolationist" as applied to everybody who disagreed h the President's policy. But let's go ahead now and see whether have any agreement as to what should be done now. I think we e gone along pretty well so far.

MR. LAVES: Could we go ahead in terms of what is before the ntry at the present time; namely, the defense program itself? e President has presented a program calling for, roughly, a bil- -dollar expenditure. What are going to be the consequences of s so far as we are concerned? What influence is this program go- ; to have upon us?

MR. KINTNER: I think the first thing we should look at in cussing the defense program is whether it is for defense or for of- se. It is obviously for defense. The War Department says that

to adequately defend North and South America we need an arm of two million and a half, which would require an expenditure five billion to equip. The President's program is only one billi two hundred million. Obviously, he isn't even up to the defen point yet.

MR. SOULE: It would be a matter of years to train and equ such an army. What is more important right now is getting a adequate air force and adequate anti-aircraft defense, with a pro erly mechanized and mobile small army. But I think we should al avoid, at the same time, interfering with the supplies that the Alli need from the United States.

MR. LAVES: Exactly! Haven't you got this situation, the so far as defense is concerned: We have a long-range propositi ahead of us insulating the Western Hemisphere against what mo people consider a fairly inevitable attack if Hitler and his war m chine is successful on the Continent of Europe. Second, howeve you have the question of what is going to happen in the meantin to the Allies in their defense against Hitler.

MR. SOULE: That is the most important thing, in case th don't lose the war right away.

MR. LAVES: But in terms of our defense program there really nothing that we can do if the war moves on at its present rat

MR. KINTNER: Certainly if the Germans are going to win a matter of days or weeks, or even a few months, we cannot do an thing to prevent them.

MR. LAVES: Kintner, you were in Washington during the la week or so while all these questions were debated. How far do y suppose there was support for the defense program because peop thought this was finally the road to recovery?

MR. KINTNER: I would doubt that the defense program being supported as a road to recovery. It is being supported as practical measure to protect us from the dictatorships. Howeve

re are some people (I don't agree with them) who think a defense gram is a method of reviving business. It isn't scientific, and ainly none of the relief program or the other objectives can be rificed to it.

MR. SOULE: Let's hammer home one point here right now. ink we are all agreed that a larger defense program than we have is necessary, but I think it is also true that it won't help re- ery very much, and certainly will not do away with the need for ef. It won't help the farmers; it won't help the workers.

MR. KINTNER: Mrs. Roosevelt made that point today in her mn: Not to forget that one-third of the nation still has its needs hout regard to the rearmament program.[13]

MR. LAVES: That means that all of those people who think t finally the problems of economic recovery have been solved by going to war have another think coming, and it is important that uilding up our defenses we don't give up our relief programs and problem of the ill-fed, the ill-housed, and the ill-clothed.

MR. SOULE: I agree with you.

MR. KINTNER: Another thing, we also should be sure that know that we are going to have to pay, and pay through the nose. ld you that the War Department said it would take five billion lars to equip an adequate army. The Navy Department says, in e of the destruction of the British fleet, it would take seven bil- dollars to build an Atlantic fleet. We are going to have to pay pay through the nose.

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[13] *Mrs. Roosevelt wrote in her column May 19: "We must not use s program for national defense as an excuse to enable us to ignore the ally vital national defense of having people devoted to democracy and ing that democracy meets their need. The one-third of the nation ill-, ill-housed, and ill-clothed is the most fertile ground for the seeds of sension strewn so ably today by some of the world's enemies."*

MR. LAVES: Pardon me for bringing this up, but just think how much cheaper it would have been to appoint an ambassador to the League of Nations in 1920. Just think of the comparison that is involved here.

MR. SOULE: I don't think it would have prevented what has developed, but let's go on. I think there is yet another danger beneath the new drive for armament. Certain interests will try to do away with the protection of labor standards, and with collective bargaining and civil liberties.

MR. KINTNER: That is a problem that should be watched. But it seems to me it is a little far-fetched to believe that this Administration is going to ask for repeal of the wages and hours and labor relations acts.

MR. SOULE: Certain Congressmen are doing it, though.

MR. KINTNER: That's not the Administration.

MR. LAVES: Associated with that is also going to be the demand that we give up some of our civil liberties.

MR. KINTNER: I think you are right, Laves. That is more important.

MR. LAVES: What I am really worried about is that people who heretofore had a freedom to express their opinions are going to be told to keep still now because we are facing a national crisis. The "Fifth Column" movements on the Continent of Europe have made a lot of people more suspicious than they have any business being.

MR. SOULE: The danger is that while we are preparing to shoot at Hitler and aim at him (although we could not possibly hit him) with this new preparation during the next couple of years, we shall first start by hitting American labor standards and civil liberties in this country.

MR. LAVES: On the other hand, it is also true that we are go-

to have a very material increase in concentration of power. You e to have that inevitably, and that does not mean fascism.

Although we disagree very much (you and I, Soule, in particular), three of us seem to agree that the United States is not going to e any very great influence upon the immediate course of the r, except as we may influence what Italy does by showing that ntend to be concerned with the outcome. We agree on this, too: we need to build our defenses for the long-range future when ourselves, may be on the spot. But we also agree that in building defense program we should not forget that we still have basic nomic problems in this country—basic problems of guaranteeing civil liberties, for instance—and that we must insist that we ve competent leadership if there is to be this concentration of wer under the new defense program.

OBJECTIVE QUESTIONS FOR EXAMINATION

The answers to the following questions may be found in the text of the broadcast, and page references are provided to assist in locating the answers.

*

1. What three alternative results of the present war were generally accepted before the German invasion of the Low Countries and France? Page 3.
2. What new possibility has recently appeared? Page 3.
3. Describe the French offensive plan that stopped the German drive on Paris in 1918. Page 4.
4. List the principles of President Roosevelt's foreign policy as stated by Mr. Kintner. Pages 5–6, 8.
5. What policy was advocated by the President in his Chicago bridge dedication speech? Page 10.
6. List some of the "methods short of war" adopted by the present Administration. Page 13.
7. Allied purchasing power in the United States last September was estimated at what figure? Page 16.
8. What two aspects of the Administration's foreign policy are criticized by Mr. Soule? Page 19.
9. What estimates do Army and Navy spokesmen make for adequate defense of the Western Hemisphere? Page 21.
10. What internal problems must not be neglected, in the opinion of the speakers, while attention is given to national defense? Page 21.

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The following questions of wider scope, intended for discussion, are suggested by the broadcast, and answers may be found in the literature of the subject listed in the section "Suggested Readings," found on page 26.

*

A widely-held view in this country is that America was drawn into the first World War because of economic interest in Allied victory. Do you think the free grant of credits at the present time would sooner or later involve us directly in the present conflict? Discuss.

Considering the purposes for which our armed forces might be used, discuss the relative importance of the army and the navy, and of the air arm of each of these services. How large an army and navy (and air force in each service) do you think necessary to protect the United States? To protect this hemisphere? To protect this hemisphere and American interests in the Far East?

Do you personally support President Roosevelt's plan for special national defense appropriations and authorizations? Do you think the sum he has requested from Congress is too large? Too small? About right?

Under which of the following circumstances do you think the United States is most likely to be involved in war:

a) A quick German victory over the Allies.
b) An Allied victory or indicated victory.
c) A stalemate over a period of years.
d) An eventual German victory.

Is it possible for a nation not neutral in sentiment to be neutral in action during war? Do you believe that American pro-Allied sentiment is sufficient to involve us in war? If so, under what circumstances?

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ALSOP, JOSEPH, and KINTNER, ROBERT, *American White Paper* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940. *An "experiment in contemporary history writing" outlining the basic principles of Roosevelt's foreign policy and the background of America's present policy toward the European war, with some consideration of the future in the event of an Allied victory, a stalemate, or a German conquest.*

BEARD, CHARLES A., *A Foreign Policy for America.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940. *The "elder statesman" of American isolationists outlines his views on this country's position in relation to Europe and Asia, and enunciates his thesis of "Continentalism" in opposition to "imperialism" and "internationalism."*

BIDWELL, PERCY W., "Where Our Interest Lies," *Atlantic,* March, 1940. *A consideration of the economic effect of the war on America.*

COHN, D. L., "The Road Not Taken," *Atlantic,* March, 1940. *A warning to Americans not to follow the self-delusive, unrealistic policies of British diplomacy before September, 1939, and an appeal to examine carefully the road which we are now taking.*

DAVIS, ELMER, "The War and America," *Harper's,* April, 1940.

ELIOT, GEORGE FIELDING, *The Ramparts We Watch.* New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1938. *A comprehensive study of American national defense.*

LINDBERGH, CHARLES A., "What Substitute for War?" *Atlantic,* March, 1940.

The Listeners' Round Table . . . .

Letters to the ROUND TABLE *frequently contain sidelights on the subject matter discussed on the air. These comments are from letters received following the broadcast May 12, "Blitzkrieg."*

*

Let 'em!

WHY DON'T THE NEW YORKERS ENLIST?*

World War Veteran

*

Tin Tip

When you talked about the tin required by our country this morning I was reminded of the fact that the world's supply of tin is controlled by an English syndicate.

Although it has been nearly forty years since I was buying tin for a large manufacturer of tin plate I well remember that for years the price had ranged from 12½ to 14¢ per pound. When the English tin syndicate was organized in about 1898 the price skyrocketed to 35¢—and a few weeks later to 40¢ and on up. Today the price is 50¢ or more. I am informed that the cost of mining and smelting tin is about the same as when that metal sold for 12½¢ per pound. This country, according to figures of thirty years ago, uses 40% of all the tin produced. This is something to ponder over.

G. W. J., California

*

Stay Out!

You did well to stumble for words when you spoke of the attitude of the people of this country toward the European war. We are very definitely opposed to connection with it at all.

There are too many pressing problems at home for us to have any time to give to the foreign situation. We will need our complete resources to cope with the staggering problem of the depression here without incurring a several billion dollar war debt. Our foreign affairs are trivial compared with the amount we stand to lose in a major war of this sort.

I have listened to your truly remarkable ROUND TABLE discussions on economic and political problems with great interest in the past and I hope to hear them in the future. They are very enlightening.

B. A. W., Arkansas

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* *The telegram above is in reaction to the statement by one of the speakers: "I was amazed to find how much farther the people I saw (in New York) have gone in their readiness to accept war. A few will go so far as to say 'I think we ought to go in.'"*—[ED.]

Good Butter

Apart from the fact that I have lived in Singapore and can assure the speaker that shopping is done in up-to-date cold storage markets, I should like to point out that from my childhood all food stores in England have sold large quantities of Australian and especially New Zealand butter which is excellent and rarely costs more than *1s 5d* a pound. None of the speakers even mentioned New Zealand dairy produce supplied to England. I can only conclude that your speakers don't really bother to go into a matter of this kind accurately. It is just another instance of persons lending themselves to the propaganda of depreciation. . . . .

From an American housewife's point of view the remarks about Australian butter may be the one thing they will remember and they will be pitying the English for having to eat it and deploring the Australians for selling inferior butter.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Australian Trade Commission in New York.

P. I. C., Connecticut

*

The Real Reason

This ROUND TABLE should be *square*. I'm afraid it isn't. It seems to me you wiseacres took a long time to discuss a very simple question: "Why did Hitler invade Belgium and Holland?" You probably knew the answer all along but did not care to come out with it.

Hitler invaded Holland and Belgium to get at his chief enemy—England. England, the country which deliberately declared war on Germany—the country which openly declared a starvation blockade on all the German people including women and children.

F. E. M., Connecticut

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202. *War Myths*
203. *Economic Issue and 1940*
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213. *Blitzkrieg, May, 1940*

BABIES COST MONEY

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A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST

MAY 26, 1940

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DR. FRED L. ADAIR, Mary C. Ryerson Professor and Chairman of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Chief of Service, Chicago Lying-in Hospital, University of Chicago

DR. MARTHA ELIOT, Assistant Chairman, Children's Bureau, U.S. Department of Labor

LOUIS WIRTH, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Chicago

●

SUGGESTED READINGS

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FURNAS, J. C., "That Mothers May Live," *Ladies' Home Journal,* November, 1940.

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